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Abstract: The motivation for this research is to replicate the Oakland based Family 
Independence Initiative (FII) and to test the components of this model.  The FII 
program claims its success stems from a bottom-up approach structured around 
setting life-improving goals, mutual support groups, and small monetary incentives 
to achieve results.  As the popularity of this program continues to gain momentum 
in the United States, we designed a field experiment to measure the impact of 
incentives on goal achievement and economic conditions as well as the overall 
impact of the FII model. We enrolled close to 200 small business owners in four 
experimental treatments (group, no-group, incentives, no-incentives) and a fifth 
external control group. The experimental data shows that incentives have the 
strongest overall impact in improving the likelihood of goal achievement and 
economic performance.  Furthermore, the interaction of goal setting, groups, and 
incentives has positive significant impacts meaning the full FII program is indeed 
delivering on its promise to improve people’s economic life: more goals are 
achieved and monthly sales values are significantly higher than in the other 
treatment groups.  In addition to investigating the effectiveness of incentives and 
goal setting, our research found that the FII model is replicable in a developing 
country setting, promising a new potentially successful yet inexpensive way to help 
people lift themselves out of poverty. 
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1. Introduction 
  
Development economists continue to investigate why poverty persists in communities when public 
aid programs are in place to improve economic conditions of its participants.  Reasons for this trend 
could be on an individual as well as community level.  With past generations of community 
members living as public aid recipients, current generations do not see their futures as being any 
different than their elders’ situation.  Therefore, in addition to not having a role model, there is no 
knowledge of programs available that can serve as guidance to escaping a seemingly predestined 
poverty path.  This limits tapping into more diverse and informative networks, unfortunately, 
especially since expansive social networks could increase the likelihood of getting a job or important 
information.  The combination of these trends can lead to a poverty trap and the idea that maybe 
current poverty reduction programs are not best systems to use in improving economic conditions.  
Clearly there is a need for a system that provides the tools for low-income individuals to take an 
initiative in their lives and become free from public aid programs.  Trying to stimulate motivation 
can be lost at the policy-making level as the standards for continued support often further 
discourage an individual or family member to ameliorate their low-income situation (Beaulier & 
Caplan, 2007).  Unfortunately, when policy makers use income stability as a motivator, it can be the 
exact tool that encourages the culture of poverty to persist (Taylor, Samblanet, & Seale, 2011).  Even 
though programs come from the best intentions, supporting evidence could direct policy to take a 
different approach by drawing from other fields in order to understand the needs of the recipients. 
Based on the shortcomings of the current US welfare system, the Family Independence 
Initiative (FII) aims to answer the call for a new poverty model by emphasizing the importance of 
individuals realizing that they have the capability to lift themselves out of poverty rather than 
succumbing to the incentive of staying on public aid.  The founder and recent recipient of the 
MacArthur Foundation’s Genius Award, Maurice Lim, created a potentially revolutionary program 
in Oakland, California, that encourages and rewards individuals for taking steps to become 
financially independent from public aid systems.  He feels policies should embrace the motivation 
behind the monetary needs to take a capability approach that can help a person take advantage of his 
or her real opportunities based on ability (Sen, 1999) and the FII Model aims to do this.  Lim’s 
strategy is to organize leaders in low-income communities called “core families” to create support 
groups with “ripple families” that meet monthly to set goals, discuss individual progress, and work 
together to find ways to achieve them.  The meetings serve as accountability and encouragement 
with the ultimate objective to create behavioral change so together the families can work to improve 
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economic conditions.  In addition to the accountability and encouragement of the group, the family-
set goals act as initiative to better their economic situation, in line with the capabilities approach.  To 
maintain the emphasis on participant led initiative, the FII liasons provide referrals and technical 
support only upon request which flows the idea  that improving access to these tools can improve 
self-motivation (Beaulier & Caplan, 2007; Haagh, 2011).  As a reward for the initiative and successful 
achievement, the families earn individual monetary payments starting at $30 and capping at $50.  
Clearly, the payment cannot replace income but it does provide a salient option to encourage 
participation in actions that should be done to make life better and avoids the moral hazard issue 
that crowds out initiative in current public aid programs (Haagh, 2011). Combining these three 
components, the FII claims significant improvements in levels of savings, home ownership, business 
activity, and earnings (“Data – Our Results”, 2013).  These claims are substantial and powerful as a 
poverty alleviation model but leads to the question if the successes indicative of the geographical 
location or if this program applies to all low-income families.   
 We replicate this revolutionary model in Medellin, Colombia to determine if the successes 
can be implemented in a developing country.  In particular, we assess the extent to which incentives 
contribute to the program’s (yet to be determined) success.  The importance of setting a goal 
connects the economic focus of this paper to psychology and encompasses the idea of necessary 
motivation in order to achieve a desired outcome.  With the FII Model, though, the social capital 
aspect of this program garners more emphasis that the rewards for achievement.  The effect of 
incentives should not be discounted as the strength of this mechanism could be the driving force 
that makes the program a lower cost alternative to other poverty reduction programs.  Through 
replication we test the components of this model in order to provide practitioners tested tools to 
improve current and future policies. 
 Anticipating our results, the experimental data shows that incentives are important tools to 
use in conjunction with goal setting but that combining support groups with small incentives leads 
to significant improvement in goal achievement levels.  We also find that the same combination is 
effective in improving economic outcomes that further links the importance of the FII Model to its 
successful claims with a true counterfactual measure. 
  Section 2 presents a review of the relevant literature. Section 3 offers the testable hypotheses 
as well as describes our experimental design and survey instruments.  Section 4 covers the empirical 
method used in data analysis and results.  Section 5 concludes with a discussion.  
2. Review of the Literature 
The FII Model evolved from the shortcomings of current poverty alleviation programs and answers 
! 4 
a call in the literature for a more complete and grassroots approach to assistance programs.  The 
components of the model surely are the keys to its success and focusing first on the aspects of goal 
setting provides a rich literature in psychology that explores the nature and impacts of goal 
formation.  Literature presents a theoretical background to explore and emphasize that “the essence 
of life is goal-directed action” and when striving for those values stops, life indeed loses meaning 
(Locke, 2002).  Despite the central role goal setting plays in life, and the supposition that motivation 
ensures achievement, barriers can remain.  Psychology literature then merges with topics from 
economics, health care, management, and education to explain how incentives overcome the barriers 
to achievement.   
Goal Setting Theory 
The components of the FII model are powerful yet simple.  At the very basis of the model, 
the participants choose goals to achieve that are meant to improve their household and business 
lives.  A rich literature in psychology has explored the nature and impact of goal formation through 
goal setting theory.  It is centered on the idea that happiness in life is the successful achievement of 
one’s values however goals and values must coincide with the needs of a person or the result will be 
self-destruction (Locke, 2002).  Goal setting theory emphasizes how a person chooses goals based 
on difficulty, specificity, feedback, commitment, self-efficacy, knowledge of the task, incentives, 
personality, and the goal’s affect (Locke, 2002; Hollensbe & Guthrie, 2000; Locke & Latham, 1990).  
Applying the theory to empirical work, inferences about the recipe for successful goal setting 
and achievement in individual, group, and organization environments are formulated from the 
experimental data of multiple authors (Locke & Latham, 1990). First, specific and difficult goals lead 
to better performance than easy vague goals that focus on just “doing your best” (Locke & Latham, 
1990).  Surprisingly, findings state that assigned versus chosen goals can lead to the same 
productivity as long as there is commitment to the task by the goal seeker; furthermore, the 
individual must have the ability to reach or approach the goal (Locke & Latham, 1990).  Assuming 
that ability is adequate and there is commitment, as the difficulty of achieving a goal increases so 
does the performance of the individual (London & Oldham, 1976).  Therefore, as the minimum 
performance required increases, so should the ease of attaining the goal, which could reflect a 
motivation of goal achievement (London & Oldham, 1976).  Ideally, goals should grow organically 
from the values and needs of a person and, based on these standards, the motivation to reach the 
goals also should evolve naturally.  However, an individual or group could have goals that are 
shaped by non-optimal payoffs to create a distorted view of the path to goal achievement and are 
represented by barrier to achievement.  For example, barriers can include where one irrationally puts 
wishes before reality; there is unwillingness to put forth effort, either mentally or physically; and a 
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plethora of fears that can range from fear of change to fear of failure (Locke, 2002).  When there is a 
disconnect between goal setting and achievement, incentives can be used to encourage realignment 
and motivation when theory does not hold reality to the same standards.    
Goals and Incentives 
In order to induce a desired outcome from either self-selected or administered goals, usually 
incentives are involved, as barrier to achievement may be too much for an individual to overcome.  
Using incentives to encourage behavior is controversial as it can be seen a bribery regardless of the 
motivation (Kamenetz, 2011).  Naturally, the process to appropriate goal setting with effective 
incentive packages can prove difficult since individuals to not always act as the traditional homo 
economicus in terms of utility.  Reflecting back to psychology literature, if goals are not aligned 
correctly with an individual’s true needs and values, incentives could be effective to encourage a 
proper hierarchy. Simply put, incentive levels are chosen based on individual and social utility 
maximization; however, based on the nature of utility, it is difficult to determine that ideal level 
accurately and easily (Kerr, et al. 2011).  Whether the incentive is based on individual or group 
achievement, incentives can prove to be effective in ushering people to make socially optimal and 
rational decisions but reviews are diverse.  Narrowing the topic to a development microeconomic 
sense leads to the question of if the incentive is right, can a person be motivated to achieve a goal 
that leads to life outside of poverty. 
Literature on incentive experiments remains compelling and is full of economic research in a 
theoretical and empirical sense (Ashraf, Bandiera, & Jack, 2012).  The most common incentivized 
goal setting with individuals can be seen in health literature and spans many disciplines such as 
management, therapy, and social work.  Locke, Bryan, and Kendall (1968) first began expanding this 
field by their laboratory experiments to prove the hypothesis that there is a correlation between 
incentives, chosen goals, and self-selected goals.  They found that incentives influence the nature of 
the intentions one develops for a task, may persuade an individual to accept an assigned goal, and 
affect the degree of commitment to the goal but the incentive effects only occur when goal setting 
takes place (Locke, Bryan, & Kendall, 1968). Pritchard and Curtis (1973) challenged the 
methodology with results that large incentives and goal setting led to greater performance levels. 
Their results failed to confirm the hypothesis that incentives have no effect on performance level 
outside of their effects on goal setting, which proves why replication is crucial for experiments.  
Overall, financial incentives should not be substituted for goal setting practices and incentives do 
adjust performance levels (Pritchard & Curtis, 1973; London & Oldman, 1976).  
In health, management, and education literature, additional experiments have confirmed that 
incentives influence goal achievement.  Haisley, et al. (2012) found that encouraging employees to 
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complete health risk assessments through lottery incentives has a higher impact than direct payment 
incentives alone. This treatment system is very applicable in policy because it reflects what truly 
motivates individuals to complete tasks when an incentive of better health is not enough.  Research 
done by Rose and Manley (2011) on incentivized construction procurement contracts yields a 
surprising result that incentives seem to be less important than the relationship enhancement 
initiatives of the program.    This upholds the idea that financial incentives may not be the most 
important aspect of goal achievement. Finally, focusing in education literature states that cash 
incentives to low-income families can be used to adjust how teenagers spend their time and affect 
their success in school (Morris, et al., 2012).  Since the experiments test incentives and goals in an 
different relationships, like employee-employer and parent-child, an application of incentives with 
goal achievement through our replication of the FII Model would compliment this literature nicely.    
To move into pro-social behavior effects in relation to incentives and goals, Kerr et al.’s 
(2011) experiments on village clean up schemes are presented. Vatn (2009) makes the argument that 
an incentive will lead to a more selfish outcome rather than a pro-social behavior.  However, in 
studies done in Tanzania and Mexico with individual and community payments for participation in 
pro-social activities, the results proved the opposite indicating that in certain situations, monetary 
incentives may not be enough of an incentive to encourage motivation (Kerr et al., 2011).  Ashraf, 
Bandiera, and Jack (2012) expand this topic in Zambia and find that non-financial incentives 
induced higher performance in the randomly selected subjects than monetary incentives.  Although 
monetary incentives cannot truly be replaced in all incentivized situations, the study shows the 
importance of analyzing a goal and reward program based on the situation surrounding the aims of 
motivating agents. 
Economists have expanded research in the field to focus on quantitative performance and 
responses to different rewards to determine the which level of incentive will create the same 
outcome predicted in classical economics and game theory (Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000). Incentives 
cause improvement in performance when one is offered but it is possible that introducing an 
incentive after performance is expected can actually cause lower performance levels (Gneezy & 
Rustichini, 2000).  Their results uphold Deci’s work that incentives can create a decreased intrinsic 
motivation. In these experiments, the hidden costs of incentives are revealed.  In a business 
organization context, many believe goals have become too specific and encourage individuals to 
pursue incentives for incorrectly ranked values (Ordóñez et al., 2009).  The authors go as far to say 
that goals inhibit motivation, learning, and cooperation; however, they do offer how to avoid the ten 
pitfalls described by Locke and Latham (2009) to adjust an all-purpose remedy for motivation to be 
effective for goal achievement.  Kohn (1993) also offers ideas of how to improve current incentive 
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plans so that temporary compliance is avoided.  Presenting this view offers more details of how to 
improve on current goal and incentive policies currently used. 
The literature above presents the complex and interesting interaction between goals and 
incentives from different disciplines.  Based on currently published research, there are no 
experimental results that present the interaction of goals and incentives in relation to development 
economics programs.  A call for research that focuses on the relation between goals and incentives 
as it relates to poverty alleviation would add significant depth to existing literature and ultimately 
answer the question of whether the incentives can motivate a person in poverty to achieve financial 
independence.  Using our experimental approach to replicate the FII Model will answer this 
question in relation to goal achievement and improved economic outcomes. 
 
3. The Experiment 
Predictions can be made as to how subjects will respond to the treatments assigned over the course 
of the program.  As mentioned earlier, this research focuses on two components of the FII Model: 
setting goals and receiving small incentives for achieving goals.  Incorporating the impact of the 
group treatment, an analysis of FII Model can indicate to researchers and policy makers if a similar 
program could universally be used to encourage individuals to complete tasks for the betterment of 
their families and businesses.    Our experiment sought to test these expected interactions based on 
theory and the current success of the FII through the four research questions listed below that we 
test using an experimental approach. 
HYPOTHESIS 1: The FII Model, driven by the effect of an incentivized payment structure, will lead to higher levels of 
goal achievement.  This hypothesis flows from Goal Setting Theory and incentive literature to indicate 
that it is possible to realign a person’s values by providing the correct level of incentive (Locke, 
2002).  Ultimately, this hypothesis determines if incentives is the key to success for the FII program 
and further concludes if it can be replicated. 
HYPOTHESIS 2: Setting a goal will lead to higher economic outcomes.  Upholding this hypothesis would be 
contrary to the findings of Locke, et al. (1968), as it would prove that setting a goal alone correlates 
with improved performance.  This would add to the literature as goal setting alone has not been 
linked in a development context. 
HYPOTHESIS 3: Receiving an incentive for achieving a goal will lead to higher economic outcomes.  Incentives 
associated with goal achievement have many positive experimental results to back up its 
effectiveness (Locke & Latham, 1990; Gneezy & Rustichini, 2000; Kerr, et al., 2011); however, 
literature also provides a cautionary tale to using incentives as a cure all (Kohn, 1993; Ordóñez, 
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2009).  
HYPOTHESIS 4: The interaction of setting a goal, meeting in groups, and receiving an incentivized payment will lead 
to higher economic outcomes.  Lim’s team written the literature that connects these three topics to a 
poverty alleviation context be comparing the outcomes of FII families in the United States before 
and after their participation (Miller, et al., 2004).  Without a valid counterfactual, it is uncertain as to 
the true impact of the model; therefore, this hypothesis will determine if the FII Model’s impacts are 
replicable outside of the United States and have positive effects on the subjects.  
3.1 Site and Subjects 
  We designed a field experiment based on a 2×2 design involving 4 experimental cells 
(treatment conditions: no-incentives/no-group; incentives/no-group; no-incentives/group; 
incentives/group) plus an external control (to be explained below). Shown in Figure 1 is a 
visualization of the treatments. The experiment was carried out in Medellín, Colombia (population 
2.7 million) by a team of graduate students and enumerators in coordination with a local 
microfinance and development organization called El Banco de los Pobres – El Banco de las 
Oportunidades or The Bank of the Poor – The Bank of Opportunities, henceforth called The Bank.  
All of the subjects fit the requirements for receiving a microfinance loan from The Bank in that they 
are low income residents of Medellín that own their own business and between the ages of 18 to 65.  
Since The Bank has multiple lending and development opportunities, the potential project 
participants were recruited from individual lenders that were members of the Artisan and CEDEZO 
(Los Centros de Desarrollo Empresarial Zonal or Zonal Business Development Center) program.  
Also included are members of the Solidarity Circle Group Lending Program.  This will be important 
later as this group was assigned to the same treatment to avoid cross talk.  Finally, members of a 
group called Capital Semilla, or Seed Capital, were included that are small business owners that 
submit unique business ideas to the mayor’s office to receive a grant to continue with the plan.  
Additional details about recruitment can be found in Appendix B.  The baseline recruitment process 
yielded 138 subjects that we randomly assigned into one of the five experimental groups.  The end 
line control group was recruited using the same methodology to add an additional 21 subjects to give 
a total sample size of 159 subjects over seven total monthly meetings from June 2012 to December 
2012 summing to 1,113 observations.  Participation rates are quite high, with only 23 subjects, or 
14%, dropping from the program after at least 2 meetings during the project.  
 In our sample, 5% of the subjects are illiterate, 21% of the subjects attended elementary 
school, 38% have attended high school, 28% of the subjects attended technical or technology 
courses, which are equivalent to associate degrees in the US; and 8% of the subjects have attended 
university or graduate school.  The average age of participants is 40 years with females comprising 
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58% of the sample.  The most common occupation for the subjects is food and beverage at 33% 
with the second highest being artisan work at 18% and third being textiles and manufacturing at 
14%.  Tables 1A and 1B show complete summary statistics by treatment group, economic activity by 
gender is presented in Table 2, and histograms of the statistics are shown in Table 3.  Although 
randomization creates insignificantly different treatment versus control group (seen in Table 1B in 
the No Group/Group treatment), it is important to note that among the treatment groups there are 
some unexpected significant differences that we explore in more detail in robustness checks.   
3.2 Experimental Design 
 Our field experiment consists of three treatments: a control with no manipulators, a 
treatment to examine the effects of group dynamics, and a treatment to investigate the effects of an 
incentivized payment structure.  Regardless of the group assignment in the project, each subject was 
randomly assigned three components: setting a goal or not, attending a group meeting or as an 
individual, and receiving an incentivized payment structure or flat payment.  Each of the 
manipulations is explained below as well as the description of the control and treatment group 
meetings. 
 No Goal Set or Setting a Goal.  Setting a goal meant that the subject was required to choose one 
goal to work towards achieving in the four weeks until the next meeting.  These goals are listed in 
Table 4 and include a mixture of business-related and personal goals as well as repeatable and single 
attempt goals.  Based on the answers from preliminary survey questions, the research team chose 
realistic and desired goals of the participating subjects.  For all subjects except members of control 
Group 1, the subject provided documentation every four weeks to prove that the goal was achieved.  
The third column of Table 4 presents the documents that were required to verify achievement and 
the fourth column states if the subject may repeat the goal.  The final column indicates percentage 
of times a goal was chosen out of 594 instances in the duration of the project. The three most 
common goals chosen were increasing savings, keeping accounting statements for business activities, 
and attending CEDEZO trainings.  The top three goals do not coincide with the goals ranked most 
difficult which are joining the social health system, purchasing a durable home good, and 
implementing a marketing strategy.  In fact, the three most popular goals have an overall ranking 9th, 
4th, and 13th, respectively.  Upholding Goal Setting Theory, the subjects confirm that specific and 
reasonably difficult goals are important when choosing a goal (London and Oldham, 1976).   
 Meeting Individually or as a Group. This treatment is an effort to isolate the effects of group 
accountability and social capital.  Subjects assigned to group treatment stand in front of their group 
and state their name, business, chosen goal before, and the new goal chosen for the upcoming 
meeting.  Also, the subjects shared how the achievement process went and listening group members 
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offered advice and praise to their fellow member.  Group membership did not mean that the group 
chose a single goal and that all had to achieve it; rather, each member chose a goal and each member 
was accountable to his achievement when documentation was presented for payment. For the 
remaining treatments, the surveys were completed without group discussion about their achievement 
process, which means those subjects did not have to state the chosen goal to anyone other than the 
enumerators.   
 Flat Payment or Incentivized Payment Structure.  All subjects received payment for attendance, 
complete surveys, and group participation, if required.  Treatment subjects received 5,000 COP 
(3USD) for the first meeting, as it was an orientation to the program.  In the remaining meetings, 
subjects either received a flat payment or an incentivized payment structure.  Compensation values 
follow in each experimental group description.  The level of payment guarantees saliency as well as 
ensures that average payment was the same between the control and all treatment groups.  The 
incentive served to compensate the subjects for their time completing surveys and, if a member of 
incentivized payments, to reward subjects for goal achievement.  All subjects were required to sign 
receipts of payment, which enumerators kept in binders organized by group.  For all treatment 
groups, the enumerator wrote the chosen goal for the following four weeks and mark if the goal 
from the previous month had been achieved after document review.  If a subject completed another 
goal the enumerator marked this and wrote the achieved goal instead.  An example of the payment 
sheets can be seen in Figure 2. 
3.3 Description of Treatment Groups 
 The following sections will describe the details of each group’s rules of participation.  The 
experimental matrix with sample sizes can be found in Figure 2.  Appendix C provides the translated 
rules of the game that were provided to the subjects on the day of the first meeting.  The 
explanations of surveys mentioned follow the description of the experimental groups.  
 Control Group 1: No Goal, No Group, and Flat Payment.  The subjects in the control did not 
choose a goal, did not have a group meeting, and received a flat payment.  Subjects honestly and 
completely filled out surveys at each meeting held in June, October, and December 2012 in which 
subjects received a flat payment of 25,000 COP (14USD) as compensation.  Meetings for this group 
involved arriving at the meeting location within a time frame to fill out the required surveys.  As 
previously mentioned, this group contains a baseline and end line control group.  
 Treatment Group 2: Goal, No Group, and Flat Payment.  Subjects in treatment Group 2 met every 
four weeks, chose a goal, and received a flat payment of 30,000 COP (17USD) each meeting 
regardless of goal achievement.  Since these subjects were not in a group, the meetings were solely 
for survey completion with little interaction from other group members.  In fact, subjects could 
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work towards another goal and receive the same payment. 
 Treatment Group 3: Goal, Group, and Flat Payment.  Subjects in treatment Group 3 met every 
four weeks, chose a goal, and participated in the same flat payment structure of 30,000 COP 
(17USD) each meeting regardless of achievement.  Since these subjects were in a group, the 
meetings for this group comprised of survey completion with a group meeting.  Enumerators began 
the meeting once all the subjects arrived by asking one subject to stand before the group to start the 
sharing process.  After the meeting, the subjects submitted their goal achievement documents to the 
enumerator.  The solidarity circle mentioned previously, was randomly assigned to this treatment as 
one unit to avoid contamination of the treatments.  Possibly, this interaction among subjects brings 
an element of additional social capital into this treatment.  Enumerators were instructed to keep the 
meetings focused on survey completion rather than group interaction but t-tests may reflect the 
interaction of the subjects.   
 Treatment Group 4: Goal, No Group, and Incentivized Payment.  Subjects in treatment Group 4 met 
every four weeks, chose a goal, and participated in an incentivized payment structure receiving a 
payment of 35,000 COP (19USD) each meeting based on achievement of their chosen goal.  If the 
subject did not achieve their goal based on documentation provided to the enumerator, the subject 
received a payment of 5,000 COP (3USD) each meeting.  Since these subjects were not in a group, 
the meetings were solely survey completion with little interaction from other members.  
Enumerators were instructed to keep the meetings focused on survey completion rather than group 
interaction.  
 FII Model Treatment Group 5: Goal, Group, and Incentivized Payment.  Subjects in Group 5 met in 
a group setting every four weeks, chose a goal, and participated in the same incentivized payment 
structure mentioned in Group 4.  Since these subjects were in a group, the meetings comprised of 
survey completion with a group meeting.  Enumerators began the meeting once all the subjects 
arrived by asking one subject to stand before the group to begin the sharing process.  
3.4 Data Collection  
 Depending on the treatment, subjects completed one to four surveys each meeting.  Figure 4 
presents the meeting schedule for all the groups with corresponding surveys.  Every four weeks a 
separate experimental session was held with each of the treatment groups, except control Group 1, 
which only met at the beginning, midpoint, and final meetings.  The monthly schedule involved 
three full days of meetings with one day (Wednesday) in the San Javier CEDEZO location with all 
groups meeting, except the control group as they only three times in the course of the project.  The 
meetings for days two and three (Thursday and Friday) took place in the El Centro CEDEZO 
location where the groups were split into smaller groups throughout the day to make the 
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documentation and payment process easier. 
 The Goal Rank survey asked the subject to rank each of the goals listed in Table 4 as easy, 
normal, difficult, or not applicable in relation to the subject achieving the goal.  The next surveys, 
Demographic and Baseline, included detailed demographics and survey questions on household 
income, success of the business, victimization, migration, self-esteem, risk preferences, reference 
points, patience levels, and discount rates.  Finally, the subjects completed a Goal Survey with goal-
related and community involvement questions.  This survey also included a question that asked the 
subject to rank the difficulty of achieving the chosen goal over the previous four weeks.   
 Out of the three surveys mentioned above, the Baseline and Goal Survey were completed 
multiple times.  The Baseline questions were cut down since a few questions remained constant 
answers over time (such as migration data).  This information was collected at the baseline in June, 
the meeting in October, and at the last meeting in December.  Regardless of the goal setting 
treatment, the control and treatment groups completed this survey. At every attended meeting, 
subjects additionally completed the Goal Survey.  For the control group, the answers to these 
questions are based on a recall format that exceeds the treatment group’s recall period of the 
previous four weeks. In the final meeting, the subjects answered additional questions about the 
strengths and weaknesses of the program as well as any recommendations for the experiment, the 
CEDEZOs and The Bank.  
 
4.  Results: Do Incentives Matter? 
We present two sets of estimations: (1) On the levels of achievement of the treatment groups that 
set goals, an estimation that allows us to determine the if incentives are effective tools to improve 
achievement; (2) On the monthly sales values of all participants, in which the results present if the 
FII Model’s success expands to more than the treatment groups.  Based on the randomization of the 
experiment, we are able to rule out self-selection into treatment and can truly measure the effects of 
setting a goal with incentivized payment and with the interaction of groups and incentives in this 
sample of low-income small business owners in Medellín, Colombia.  All estimations use time fixed 
effects, which corrects for serial correlation between observations within the same time period, and 
standard errors clustered at the individual level, to account for panel structure of the dataset.  
Overall treatment effects are shown at the individual treatment level, the interaction of all 
manipulations without controls, and then successfully adding controls. 
 First, we estimate the treatment effect on the treated (TOT) to explore the effects of 
incentives and the FII Model on goal achievement. Although the distribution of the dependent 
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variable of achievement is a binary value, the linear probability model (LPM) remains a better option 
in order to take advantage of the simpler standard error structure of the Ordinary Least Squares 
(OLS) model.  Furthermore, interpretation is straightforward and there is no issue of values that 
exceed the 0 to 1 threshold of appropriate probability values.  Equation (1) performs a linear 
probability estimation of achievement with overall treatment effects of the incentivized payment 
structure and the FII Model as well as the effects with all controls: 
Pr(Achieved=1|Xi)=β0+FIIiβ1+PRZi β2 +GRPi β3 +DIFFit β4 +ESTit β5 +RISKit β6 +T’γ +Xi’ β+uit                (1) 
 
Where dependent variable is a binary outcome of 1 achieving a goal and 0 is not achieving a goal and 
β0 is the constant term.   FIIi, PRZi, and GRPi, are dummy variables with a value of 1 for an i subject 
randomly placed in the FII Model, Incentive, or Group treatment cells, respectively, for all time 
periods.  DIFFit represents the subject’s classification of difficulty is working towards their goal in 
each t-2 time period with values starting with 1 being easy and 5 being difficult.  The next two 
variables are created from questions that are considered to have equal weight in terms of explanatory 
power of self-esteem and the risk preferences of the subjects.  ESTit is an index created by calculating 
the mean of the survey answers concerning self-esteem.  The higher the value the more confident an 
individual i is for time t.  RISKit is an index created from the mean of the answers to risk questions 
included in the survey.  The higher the value the more risk-loving an individual i is for time t.  The 
T’  vector represents the time fixed effects with and 0 or 1 value for t-2 periods as the first second 
round is the first in achievement data is collected.  The vector of controls Xi’ includes age of the 
participant, highest education level (starting with 1 as illiterate and 5 as university education), and 
gender (female equals 1).  Finally, uit is the random error term.  Reviewing the literature, the 
explanatory variables chosen reflect the determinants of successful completion of a goal (Locke, 
2002).  
 In addition to estimating a model for the effect of the TOT, we again use cross sectional 
regression analysis to estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) for all subjects but using a proxy 
for achievement.  The reported monthly sales value is used as a proxy for goal achievement since the 
control group does not choose a goal to achieve. The monthly sales index also represents the 
performance of the subject and can be used to evaluate the impacts of goal setting on improved 
economic outcomes.  In this way, the counterfactual can be incorporated, as the control groups did 
not have any of the three manipulations as opposed to the treated group who all worked towards a 
goal.  This estimation investigates the effects of goal setting, incentivized payment structure, and the 
FII Model alone and then estimates total effects using controls.  Equation (2) performs a linear 
estimation of the effects of the sales value index: 
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Salesit=β0 +FIIiβ1 +PRZi β2 +GRPi β3 +GOALit β4 +ESTit β5 +RISKit β6 +T’γ +Xi’ β+uit                                   (2) 
 
Where the dependent variable is an ordered response of 1 being the lowest level of sales and 6 being 
the highest level of sales. FIIi, PRZi, and GRPi remain in the regression with an addition of GOALit to 
include the control group in the estimation.  These variables are 1 if the subject was in the treatment 
groups and 0 otherwise.  DIFFit is removed since this value is only associated with the achievement 
levels.  T’  represents the same vector to time dummies except now it is for t-1 time periods as data 
on monthly sales is collected at each time period of the study.  The remaining variables are ESTit, 
RISKit, and Xi’ with the same interpretations as before with Equation (1).   
 Our experimental design allows us to utilize t-tests for initial impact analysis by comparing 
the differences in average achievement and average monthly sales per person between treatment 
groups.  The results for each hypothesis test are presented below with t-test results and results of the 
specifications described in Equations (1) and (2).   
HYPOTHESIS 1: Incentives and the FII Model and Goal Achievement   
 Visually seen in Figure 5, it seems incentives lead to a significant difference between average 
group achievements as seen in the comparisons of Groups 2 and 3 to Groups 4 and 5.    Statistically, 
t-test results in Table 4 presents significant differences between individual incentive treatment 
groups to non-incentive treatments all at the 1% level.  Recalling that the Solidarity Circle Group 
was randomly assigned to Group 3, we see that the impacts of the pre-existing social capital does 
not lead to a significant difference in achievement levels looking the individual t-tests.  Table 5 
indicates that the average achievement values for subjects is significantly higher for the incentive 
treatment group comprising of Groups 4 and 5.  
 Our empirical approach first estimates the effects of incentives on goal achievement using 
Equation (1) shows in Table 6.  Column 2 shows that subjects in the incentive treatment have a 
higher probability of achieving a chosen goal, a significant effect at the 1% level.  Connecting the 
literature on goal setting theory, self-help groups, and incentives, we find that the combination of 
these three things in the FII Model lead to a strong overall importance of the FII Model in the 
probability of achievement.  Based on the the significance of the incentive treatment, this is most 
important component contributing to the success of the model. Focusing on the FII Model in 
Column 1, we see an overall positive effect at the 1% level.  Combining all the manipulations in 
Column 4, the FII Model maintains a positive and significant impact on achievement and the 
incentive treatment loses impact.  With additional controls in Columns 5 and 6, the FII Model 
continues to increase the probability of achievement significantly.  The full specification of the 
econometric model indicates that the FII Model and incentive treatment have a positive and 
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significant effect on the probability of goal achievement at the 5% and 10% level respectively.  Most 
importantly, we see that the FII Model increases the probability of treatment by 13-percentage 
points on average (mean = 83%). 
 Interestingly, groups have a negative and significant effect on achievement at the 10% level.  
Although not the focus of this paper, this could have to do with the fact that the groups are 
randomly formed and are not able to capture the social capital that exists in the community.  The 
FII Model, though, has a stronger and more significant impact, which overpowers the negative sign 
of the group treatment further emphasizing the combination of group meetings and incentivized 
payments leads to successful increases in achievement.  The difficulty in achievement results as one 
reason why subjects are less likely to achieve a chosen goal as it is negative and significant at the 1% 
level indicating that the more difficult the goal, the probability of achieving the goal decreases by 8-
percentage points on average.  This finding upholds literature found in goal setting theory (Locke, 
2002).   
 The results of this estimation suggest that the FII Model is replicable in terms of improved 
probability of achieving goals among the treated subjects.  As the goal list is comprised of tasks that 
could lead to improvement of a subject’s life professionally or personally, the incentive effect could 
be effectively realigning of goals and needs.     
HYPOTHESIS 2: Goal Setting and Economic Outcomes.   
 To measure the impacts of our experiment with a counterfactual measure of the control 
group, we look to the impacts of setting a goal on monthly sales levels.  As mentioned previously, 
the control group did not set goals during the program, which means the estimations of impact 
require a variable that is measurable in both the treatment and control groups.  In order to estimate 
the effects of goal setting, estimations of Equation (2) use the monthly sales index as the dependent 
variable.   
 Figure 6 presents a visual of the sales values for all subjects by group indicating we would 
not expect a significant difference between Groups 1 versus Groups 2, 3, 4, and 5.  T-tests in Table 
8 indicate no statistical difference between treatment groups versus the control (t-statistic=0.15).  In 
overall estimations of the impact of the goal treatment as well as with all specifications in Table 9, 
setting a goal does not have a significant impact on economic outcomes. Therefore, simply being in 
the treatment group rather than the control does not cause significant changes in the monthly sales 
values.  The results add to the literature in the debate about goal setting and its impacts on 
performance (London & Oldham, 1976; Pritchard & Curtis, 1973).  To ensure the estimations are 
robust and acknowledge the sales index format is limited to 1 through 6, a Tobit estimation is shown 
in Table 9A to present insignificant results for the overall effect and with all controls.   
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HYPOTHESIS 3: Incentives and Economic Outcomes  
 Complementing incentive literature, the next specification correlates incentives to poverty 
alleviation models.  Consistent with work that connects incentives to performance, the results state 
incentives do not increase the level of performance (Kohn, 1993; Ordóñez et al., 2009).  As seen in 
Table 8, the monthly sales index can be compared between groups with the incentive treatment and 
those without, including the control groups, with t-tests.  We see the average monthly sales values 
per person are not significantly different incentivized payments versus a flat payment (t-
statistic=0.56).     
 In order to test the implications of improved performance based on the incentive treatment, 
we use continue to use Equation (2).  We first focus on the overall impact of incentives on the 
monthly sales index.  Noting that the coefficient values in this estimation are actual changes in the 
index compared to the mean monthly sales value, which is 2.64 in index form, which translates to 
about 525 USD.  Therefore, we look for values that would allow us to cross into the higher index 
value of 3.00 meaning a significant and positive impact would require a coefficient of at least 0.40.  
Results in Table 9 compliment the t-test values and show an insignificant overall impact of 
incentives on the monthly sales index.  These values do not gain significance with additional controls 
in Columns 5 through 7.  In other words, incentives do not singly lead to differences in monthly 
sales values when comparing individual experimental groups.  The Tobit estimation in Table 9A also 
shows the same insignificant coefficients. 
HYPOTHESIS 4: FII Model and Economic Outcomes   
 By upholding Hypothesis 1 that the FII Model has a strong significant impact on goal 
achievement, we want to test the treatment effect among all subjects through the economic outcome 
measure of monthly sales.  Connecting goal setting, group dynamics, and incentivized payment in a 
poverty alleviation context adds to existing literature in a way that has not been done before with a 
true counterfactual; therefore, we investigate the treatment effect of the FII model.  Testing the 
mean monthly sales value of the FII Model versus all other experimental groups is shown in Table 8 
with significance at the 10% level (t-statistic=1.79).  Figure 6 predicts this relationship at the average 
monthly sales index for Group 5 exceeds the values for all other groups and is confirmed in Table 7.   
 The most interesting results are seen in the FII model estimations presented in Table 9.  As 
described above, the coefficients represent numerical changes in the monthly sales value index in 
relation to the mean of 2.64.  With these criteria in mind, Column 1 presents the overall impact the 
FII Model on the economic outcomes of the small business owners in Medellin, Colombia.  The 
value is positive and significant at the 5% level and increases the mean sales index to above 3.00.  
Outcomes with controls are more important to view in Columns 5, 6, and 7.  All values maintain 
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significance and exceed the required value of 0.40.  All controls included in Column 7 yields a 
positive and significant impact of the FII Model on the monthly sales index a full level, at the 5% 
level. Table 9A presents a Tobit estimation of Equation (2) with slightly larger but identically 
significant coefficients indicating robustness of the results. 
 Although incentives do not lead to the improvement of economic outcomes, the importance 
of the interaction of goals, groups, and incentives increasing monthly sales values should not go 
unnoticed.  We prove through these results that the FII Model is a successful poverty alleviation 
model over time with positive impacts on improved sales that exceed the benefits received from the 
incentive alone.  Successful replication of this model in other contexts emphasizes the significance 
of the combination of goals, groups, and incentives.  Namely, the FII Model can be replicated in a 
developing country with positive results using a measure of improved sales values.   
Robustness Checks   
 Bootstrapped standard errors are calculated with 1,000 replications for each estimation of 
Equations (1) and (2) and shown in Tables 10 and 11.  The results uphold the same results in both 
specifications with slightly larger standard error values found in the coefficients in Table 11 leading 
to the conclusion that the model is robust.   
 A focus on gender provides interesting results as to the impact of incentives on goal 
achievement.  Estimations of the probability of achievement and the improvement in the sales index 
value are presented in Tables 12 and 13, respectively.  The results show that women have a larger 
impact from the FII Model and incentives than men on goal achievement.  The overall impact of 
incentives on goal achievement is significant for both men and women but women consistently see 
stronger and more significant impacts, including all controls.  For women, incentives increase the 
probability of goal achievement by 10% at the 90th percentile (mean=79%) with no increases for 
men.  These findings enrich the impacts of incentives on goal achievement.  Men experience 
strongly significant and positive overall impacts on sales values as opposed to women who do not 
have any significant impacts.  Additionally, coefficients for the goal treatment are positive and 
significant for men with an overall impact that leads to a significant increase of 2.73 in the sales 
value index based on the mean of 2.97.  Surprisingly, all coefficients for the incentive and group 
treatment are largely negative and significant.  Based on these results, we can say that women 
respond more to the FII Model in terms realigning values and needs through the goal setting and 
achievement process.  Men, however, garner more positive effects in economic outcomes due to 
goal setting and the FII Model as a whole.  More research on the impacts of the components of the 
FII Model in relation to gender would be beneficial and interesting for future research. 
 An additional specification of Equations (1) and (2) presents results for subjects separated by 
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education levels since the initial t-tests in Tables 1A and 1B show significant differences for 
education in the incentive treatments.  It could be argued that even though the education levels are 
different, the subjects still are in a low-income classification with their own business equalizing the 
effect of education.  However, to be clear and to isolate the possible impacts of education 
differences, use the threshold of greater than an associate’s degree to compare the two groups to 
indicate which component is most effective for low-income individuals.  Looking first to Table 14, 
clearly incentives are more effective for positive impacts on the probability of goal achievement for 
individuals with an overall 22-percentage point higher probability of achieving a goal if the subject 
was in the incentive treatment (mean=87%).  Comparing these results to the lower educated 
individuals, we see that the FII Model yields the most positive success with an overall 21-percentage 
point increase in the probability of achievement (mean=82%).  Interestingly, the results show that 
subjects with lower education are able to harness the impacts of the FII Model more so than the 
higher educated individuals, which are driven strongly by the incentives.  Continuing to Table 15, 
significant impacts on sales index values are only seen for higher educated subjects.  With all 
controls, the subjects only see a positive and significant impact from the FII Model resulting, on 
average, a 1.31 increase that exceed the required 0.50 coefficient requirement (mean=2.47).  It could 
be said that subjects with a higher education have more training in business operations than subjects 
with a high school education or less.  Possibly with more time and replications of this research, more 
detailed analysis can be performed.  
 Overall, the robustness checks add more explanation to the reasons for success of the FII 
Model as well as provide guidance for future research as with additional research and replication, 
these results can be used by practitioners to ensure success in current and future poverty reduction 
models. 
 
5. Discussion 
Our field experiment is designed to analyze an innovative idea for increasing financial and overall 
well being among the low-income individuals.  In Medellín, Colombia, we were able to replicate a 
program inspired by the Oakland-based Family Independence Initiative (FII). FII is centered on the 
idea that many families improve their economic situation with little help if they were capable to 
harness in a more efficient way the social capital of their neighborhood.  The program encourages 
individuals through small incentives and leads them to align their needs and wants to create goals 
that will lead to overall improvement.  Using the treatments of goal setting, incentivized payment 
structure, and group meetings, we were able to test the overall effects of each treatment as well as 
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the effect of the FII Model itself which is an interaction of all three.  Particularly, the effects of 
incentives as well as the overall effect of the FII Model are the focus for this paper. 
 Enrolling almost 200 individuals in the program from The Bank, we were able to monitor 
goal achievement and monthly sales values through survey data.  Our predictions are that incentives, 
setting a goal, and the FII Model would have a positive effect on goal achievement as well as 
monthly sales values.  In order to test these predictions, seven rounds of monthly meetings were 
held for each group from June 2012 until December 2012.   
 In our data, incentives increase the probability of goal achievement but not average monthly 
sales values, setting a goal is not significant overall in improving monthly sales values, and the FII 
Model hold significance overall and with all controls for both achievement levels and monthly sales. 
This research fulfills the motivation to test this revolutionary poverty alleviation model with a 
counterfactual measure as well as determine that incentives are an important component but the 
combination of goal setting, group meetings, and small monetary rewards is the key to its success.  
 As with any study, weaknesses do exist in this field experiment such as possible omitted 
variables and limitations on time.  Hopefully, follow-up with the subjects can be done to investigate 
the long-term effects of their membership with the FII project as running the experiment for six 
months could lead to temporary effects among the subjects.  We feel, though, that the long-term 
effects could be realized as subjects were overall quite happy with the project and requested that it 
continue in the future.  
 In terms of wider questions raised in this experiment, the components of the FII Model are 
most effective when combined together indicating that the small-scale, revolutionary, and 
inexpensive program created can be an effective tool in the poverty alleviation and development 
world.  Applying these results to development can provide an alternative and more homegrown 
method, which could be more successful than existing tools.  We hope that our research adds to the 
literature inspiring others to replicate this model in other developing country settings.  Replication is 
the best way for an economic model to be tested to its limits and allow the interactions of goal 
setting, incentives, and social capital to be explored thoroughly and, hopefully, in other country 
contexts. 
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Appendix A: Tables and Figures 
 
Figure 1: Visual of Treatment 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Experimental Matrix 
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Table 1A: Summary Statistics of the Treatment Groups Only 
  
Min Max 
Incentive Treatment  FII Treatment  
Subsamples 
Overall 
(N, Std. 
Dev) 
No  
Incentives Incentives 
t-statistic  
(N for 0,1) No FII FII 
t-statistic  
(N for 0,1) 
Control Variable 
Age 40.03 (119, 11.67) 18 67 
41.78 
(11.04) 
38.32 
(12.01) 
1.63 
(59, 60) 
40.83 
(11.65) 
37.67 
(11.59) 
1.29 
(89, 30) 
Education 3.08 (119, 1.05) 1 5 
2.73 
(0.98) 
3.43 
(1.01) 
3.85*** 
(59, 60) 
2.98 
(1.04) 
3.40 
(1.04) 
1.92* 
(89, 30) 
Female 0.59 (119, 0.49) 0 1 
0.66 
(0.48) 
0.52 
(0.50) 
1.60 
(59, 60) 
0.64 
(0.48) 
0.43 
(0.50) 
2.01** 
(89, 30) 
Baseline Variables 
Self-Esteem Level^ 3.49 (119, 0.63) 2.25 4 
3.49 
(0.64) 
3.49 
(0.62) 
0.04 
(59, 60) 
3.50 
(0.57) 
3.47 
(0.77) 
0.23 
(89, 30) 
Risk-Loving Level^^ 6.36 (117, 1.83) 1 10 
6.14 
(1.91) 
6.58 
(1.83) 
1.30 
(58, 59) 
6.32 
(1.86) 
6.50 
(1.74) 
0.47 
(88, 29) 
Consider Business 1.89 (117, 0.49) 1 3 
1.83 
(0.53) 
1.95 
(0.43) 
1.35 
(58, 59) 
1.89 
(0.51) 
1.90 
(0.41) 
0.10 
(88, 29) 
Colombia Progress Out of Poverty Index (PPI Questions)+ 
Owns a motorcycle or car 0.41 (117, 0.49) 0 1 
0.31 
(0.47) 
0.51 
(0.50) 
2.20** 
(58, 59) 
0.34 
(0.48) 
0.62 
(0.49) 
2.72*** 
(88, 29) 
Owns their own home 0.45 (117, 0.50) 0 1 
0.53 
(0.50) 
0.37 
(0.49) 
1.76* 
(58, 59) 
0.88 
(0.49) 
0.34 
(0.48) 
1.35 
(88, 29) 
Owns a functioning:          
Washer 0.80 (117, 0.40) 0 1 
0.76 
(0.43) 
0.84 
(0.37) 
1.16 
(58, 58) 
0.78 
(0.42) 
0.86 
(0.35) 
0.94 
(87, 29) 
Television 0.97 (117, 0.16) 0 1 
0.97 
(0.18) 
0.98 
(0.13) 
0.60 
(58, 59) 
0.98 
(0.15) 
0.97 
(0.19) 
0.34 
(88, 29) 
Refrigerator 0.95 (117, 0.22) 0 1 
0.93 
(0.26) 
0.97 
(0.18) 
0.86 
(58, 59) 
0.95 
(0.21) 
0.93 
(0.26) 
0.49 
(88, 29) 
DVD Player 0.59 (117, 0.49) 0 1 
0.52 
(0.50) 
0.66 
(0.48) 
1.58 
(58, 59) 
0.58 
(0.50) 
0.62 
(0.49) 
0.39 
(88, 29) 
Education: 1=illiterate, 2=primary, 3=high school, 4=associates degree, 5=university or postgraduate 
^ Range of 2.25 being low self-esteem to 4 with high self-esteem  ^^Range of 1 being most risk averse and 10 being most risk-loving 
+Information that helps us to describe low-income families in Medellin, Colombia 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level.  
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
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Table 1B: Summary Statistics for All Subjects 
  
Min Max 
Goal Treatment  Incentive Treatment  FII Treatment  
Subsamples Overall (N, Std. Dev) 
No 
Goal Goal 
t-statistic  
(N for 
0,1) 
No 
Incentives Incentives 
t-statistic 
(N for 
0,1) 
No FII FII t-statistic (N for 0,1) 
Control Variables 
Age 40.40 (159, 11.44) 18 67 
41.53 
(10.81) 
40.03 
(11.67) 
0.71 
(40, 119) 
41.67 
(10.89) 
38.32 
(12.10) 
1.81* 
(99, 60) 
41.05 
(11.36) 
37.67 
(11.59) 
1.46 
(129, 30) 
Education 3.13 (159, 1.00) 1 5 
3.28 
(0.82) 
3.08 
(1.05) 
1.04 
(40, 119) 
2.95 
(0.95) 
3.43 
(1.01) 
3.03*** 
(99, 60) 
3.07 
(0.99) 
3.40 
(1.04) 
1.64 
(129, 30) 
Female 0.58 (159, 0.49) 0 1 
0.58 
(0.50) 
0.59 
(0.49) 
0.15 
(40, 119) 
0.63 
(0.49) 
0.52 
(0.50) 
1.36 
(99, 60) 
0.62 
(0.49) 
0.43 
(0.50) 
1.88* 
(129, 30) 
Baseline Variables 
Self-Esteem Level 3.48 
(138, 0.61) 1 4 
3.41 
(0.49) 
3.49 
(0.63) 
0.54 
(19, 119) 
3.47 
(0.61) 
3.49 
(0.62) 
0.23 
(78, 60) 
3.48 
(0.56) 
3.47 
(0.77) 
0.12 
(108, 30) 
Risk-Loving Level 
6.37 
(136, 1.83) 1 10 
6.40 
(1.91) 
6.36 
(1.83) 
0.09 
(19, 117) 
6.21 
(1.90) 
6.58 
(1.73) 
1.17 
(77, 59) 
6.33 
(1.86) 
6.50 
(1.74) 
0.44 
(107, 29) 
Consider Business 
1.87 
(136, 0.50) 1 3 
1.74 
(0.56) 
1.89 
(0.49) 
1.23 
(19, 117) 
1.81 
(0.54) 
1.95 
(0.43) 
1.68* 
(77, 59) 
1.86 
(0.52) 
1.90 
(0.41) 
0.35 
(107, 29) 
Colombia Progress Out of Poverty Index (PPI Questions)+ 
Owns motorcycle or 
car 
0.43 
(136, 0.50) 0 1 
0.58 
(0.51) 
0.41 
(0.49) 
1.38 
(19, 117) 
0.38 
(0.49) 
0.51 
(0.50) 
1.52 
(77, 59) 
0.38 
(0.49) 
0.62 
(0.49) 
2.31** 
(107, 29) 
Owns home 0.49 
(136, 0.50) 0 1 
0.74 
(0.45) 
0.45 
(0.50) 
2.32** 
(19, 117) 
0.58 
(0.50) 
0.37 
(0.49) 
2.48** 
(77, 59) 
0.53 
(0.50) 
0.34 
(0.48) 
1.80* 
(107, 29) 
Owns a functioning: 
Washer 
0.81 
(135, 0.39) 0 1 
0.89 
(0.32) 
0.80 
(0.40) 
0.96 
(19, 116) 
0.79 
(0.41) 
0.84 
(0.37) 
0.78 
(77, 58) 
0.84 
(0.37) 
0.79 
(0.41) 
0.75 
(74, 61) 
Television 0.98 (136, 0.15) 0 1 
1.00 
(0.00) 
0.97 
(0.16) 
0.70 
(19, 117) 
0.97 
(0.16) 
0.98 
(0.13) 
0.35 
(77, 59) 
0.98 
(0.14) 
0.97 
(0.19) 
0.51 
(107, 29) 
Refrigerator 0.96 (135, 0.21) 0 1 
1.00 
(0.00) 
0.95 
(0.22) 
0.98 
(18, 117) 
0.95 
(0.22) 
0.97 
(0.18) 
0.52 
(76, 59) 
0.96 
(0.19) 
0.93 
(0.26) 
0.72 
(106, 29) 
DVD Player 0.59 (136, 0.49) 0 1 
0.58 
(0.51) 
0.59 
(0.49) 
0.09 
(19, 117) 
0.53 
(0.50) 
0.66 
(0.48) 
1.51 
(77, 59) 
0.58 
(0.50) 
0.62 
(0.49) 
0.40 
(107, 29) 
Education: 1=illiterate, 2=primary, 3=high school, 4=associates degree, 5=university or postgraduate 
^ Range of 1 being lowest self-esteem to 4 as highest self-esteem  ^^Range of 1 being most risk averse and 10 being most risk-loving 
+Information that helps us to describe low-income families in Medellin, Colombia 
*** Significant at the 1 percent level.  
** Significant at the 5 percent level.  
* Significant at the 10 percent level. 
 
Table 2: Economic Activity by Gender 
 Male Female Total 
Agriculture 1 1 2 
Food and Beverage 19 33 52 
Artisan 8 21 29 
Trade and Commerce 7 6 13 
Industry 3 1 4 
Leather Goods 5 3 8 
Services 12 7 19 
Technology 1 0 1 
Textile and Manufacturing 4 18 22 
Other 6 1 7 
Total 66 91 157* 
*Total sample is 159 but two subjects did not answer this question 
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Table 3: Histograms of Descriptive Statistics Overall 
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Table 4: List of Goals 
Number Goal (for the next four weeks) 
Verification 
Method Frequency 
Percent 
Chosen 
Difficulty 
Ranking^ 
1. 
Attend and complete at least ONE of workshops in 
marketing and sales, accounting, administration or 
entrepreneurship offered by El Banco de las 
Oportunidades or your local development center 
(CEDEZO) 
Registration form 
and certificate of 
completion 
Repeatable 11.11% 1.29 (0.47) 
2. Update or create a business plan for your business Present documents  Once 7.24% 1.59 (0.71) 
3. Begin or continue to keep accounting of your company or business, and show the gains and losses statement 
Present accounting 
documents Repeatable 16.16% 
1.84 
(0.77) 
4. Pay off an outstanding debt [minimum $ 60,000 Colombian Pesos (17 USD)] Receipt (with date) Once per debt 10.77% 
1.63 
(0.74) 
5. 
Purchase a machine, tool, or equipment for your 
business [minimum $ 60,000 Colombian Pesos (17 
USD)] 
Receipt (with date) Repeatable 6.06% 1.71 (0.78) 
6. 
Create and implement a marketing strategy for your 
business (website, social networking sites, etc. for those 
businesses that apply) 
Present documents/ 
websites  Once 9.09% 
1.86 
(0.84) 
7. 
Obtain any of the following licenses or registrations 
that you do not currently have (only if required for 
your business): 
- Registry with tax board                    
- Operation                      - Sanitation 
- Food handling               - Public space 
Present the 
application to the 
enumerator and/or 
group 
Once for each 
registration 5.89% 
1.70 
(0.81) 
8. 
Participate in a job fair, exhibition, or other business 
event organized by El Banco de las Oportunidades or 
your local development center (CEDEZO) 
Certificate of 
participation Repeatable 6.40% 
1.45 
(0.65) 
9. 
Save at least $ 15,000 Colombian pesos (8 USD) every 
week for next four weeks in a savings account -- If you 
do not have a savings account, we suggest you open an 
account in a cooperative 
Bank statement Repeatable 20.20% 1.64 (0.71) 
10. Make a payment to improve your credit score [minimum $ 60,000 Colombian Pesos (17 USD)] 
Credit score data 
base online Repeatable 1.52% 
1.81 
(0.75) 
11. Purchase a durable good for your home [minimum $ 60,000 Colombian Pesos (17 USD)] Receipt (with date) Repeatable 4.21% 
2.01 
(0.77) 
12. 
Apply yourself or help a member of your family apply 
for at least one of the grants or scholarships offered by 
the municipality for higher education  
Present the 
application Once 0.34% 
1.72 
(0.86) 
13. Attend a course for adult literacy (learning to read and write) 
Certificate of 
attendance Repeatable 0.51% 
1.31 
(0.64) 
14. Join the Social Security System (Health and Pension) Membership certification Once 0.51% 
2.16 
(0.85) 
^Difficulty ranking is the mean of the subject difficulty with 1=easy, 2=normal, and 3=difficult.  Standard deviation in parenthesis. 
 
Figure 2: Example of Payment and Goal Receipt 
 
*The subjects last name and ID number have been hidden 
for privacy. 
 
 
The first column corresponds to the meeting 
number with 1 being the first meeting held in June 
2012.  The second column lists the goal chosen in 
the previous meeting with check marks indicating 
that her goal was achieved.  If it was not the 
enumerator would mark an “X” next to the goal 
number in the second column.  The third column 
indicates the current goal of the subject.  The date 
of payment is listed in the fourth column and the 
value of the payment in Colombian pesos is written 
into the boxes of the fifth column.  Finally, the last 
column serves as a receipt of payment.  The control 
groups’ payment sheets included the same 
information except the second and third columns 
were removed. 
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Figure 4:  Meeting and Survey Schedule for all Groups 
Project Meeting 1* 2 3 4 5* 6 7* 
Group 
June     
2012 
July        
2012 
Aug.    
2012 
Sept.    
2012 
Oct.      
2012 
Nov.    
2012 
Dec.    
2012 
Control 1 
-Goal Rank 
-Demographic 
-Baseline 
-Goal Survey 
No meeting No meeting No meeting 
 
-Midline 
-Goal Survey 
No meeting 
-End-line 
-Goal Survey      
(with project 
feedback) Treatment 
2 
Goal Survey Goal Survey Goal Survey Goal Survey 
3 
4 
5  
Add’l 
Control 1 No meeting No meeting No meeting No meeting No meeting No meeting 
-Ranking   
-Demographic 
-End-line  
-Goal Survey 
*Control and Treatment groups completed the same surveys in meetings 1, 5, and 7 
 
 
Figure 5: Average Achievement Percentage per Subject by Group 
 
*Average percentage was adjusted for meetings attended per subject with standard deviation in parenthesis 
 
Table 4: T-Tests by Group on Average Achievement Per Person 
 
Group 2: 
No Group 
No Prize 
Group 3: 
Group 
No Prize 
Group 4: 
No Group 
Prize 
Group 5: 
FII Model 
Mean  
(Std. Dev.) 
0.66 
(0.22) 
0.58 
(0.23) 
0.70 
(0.23) 
0.81 
(0.12) 
Group 2: 
No Group 
No Prize 
-- 1.01 2.61*** 8.70*** 
Group 3: 
Group 
No Prize 
1.01 -- 5.52*** 12.96*** 
Group 4: 
No Group 
Prize 
2.61*** 5.52*** -- 5.11*** 
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Table 5: Pooled Summary Statistics of Average Achievement 
      
Subsamples  Treatment t-statistic FII Model t-statistic 
 Overall (N, Std. Dev) 
No 
Incentives Incentives (N for 0,1) No FII FII (N for 0,1) 
Average 
Achievement 
0.83 
(107, 0.24) 
0.74 
(0.25) 
0.90 
(0.20) 
3.65 
(52, 55) 
0.78 
(0.26) 
0.95 
(0.09) 
3.41 
(79, 28) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
     
Table 6: Probability of Achievement 
Dependent Variable: Subject Achievement for T=6 (OLS Estimates) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
FII Model 0.15*** 
  
0.13* 0.13** 0.14** 0.14** 0.13** 
 
(0.03) 
  
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Incentive Treatment 
 
0.18*** 
 
0.11** 0.09** 0.08 0.07 0.08* 
  
(0.04) 
 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.04) (0.05) 
Group Treatment 
  
-0.04 -0.09 -0.08 -0.11* -0.09* -0.09 
   
(0.04) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Difficulty 
    
-0.08*** 
 
-0.08*** -0.08*** 
     
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Age 
     
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
      
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education 
     
0.01 0.00 0.00 
      
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
Female 
     
-0.10*** -0.09*** -0.09*** 
      
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Self-Esteem Level 
       
0.02 
        
(0.04) 
Risk-Loving Level 
       
-0.01 
        
(0.01) 
Observations 571 571 571 571 569 571 569 561 
R-squared 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.18 0.11 0.19 0.20 
Clustered standard errors at the individual level in parentheses 
Time dummy coefficients and the constant are removed to respect the space of the paper 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Figure 6: Average Monthly Sales Value Index per Subject by Group 
 
*Average monthly sales was adjusted for meetings attended per subject and standard deviations are in parenthesis 
 
Table 7: T-Tests by Group on Average Sales Levels Per Person 
 Group 1: Control 
Group 1: 
Additional 
Control 
Group 2: 
No Group 
No Prize 
Group 3: 
Group 
No Prize 
Group 4: 
No Group 
Prize 
Group 5: 
FII Model 
Mean  
(Std. Dev.) 
2.61 
(1.47) 
2.71 
(1.81) 
2.54 
(1.51) 
2.41 
(1.45) 
2.43 
(1.35) 
3.14 
(1.59) 
Group 1: 
Control -- 0.47 0.42 1.21 1.09 2.85*** 
Group 1: 
Additional Control 0.47 -- 0.89 1.67* 1.55 2.14** 
Group 2: 
No Group 
No Prize 
0.42 0.89 -- 0.81 0.66 3.47*** 
Group 3: 
Group 
No Prize 
1.21 1.67* 0.81 -- 0.15 4.60*** 
Group 4: 
No Group 
Prize 
1.09 1.55 0.67 0.15 -- 4.44*** 
Group 5: 
FII Model 2.85** 2.14** 3.47*** 4.60*** 4.44*** -- 
 
Table 8: Pooled Summary Statistics of Average Monthly Sales 
Subsamples  Treatment t-statistic Treatment t-statistic FII Model t-statistic 
 Overall (N, Std. Dev) 
No 
Goal Goal (N for 0,1) 
No 
Incentives Incentives (N for 0,1) 
No 
FII FII (N for 0,1) 
Average 
Monthly 
Sales 
2.70 
(159, 1.42) 
2.68 
(1.61) 
2.71 
(1.35) 
0.15 
(40, 119) 
2.66 
(1.50) 
2.78 
(1.27) 
0.56 
(99, 60) 
2.61 
(1.41) 
3.12 
(1.37) 
1.79 
(129, 30) 
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Table 9: Impacts on Economic Outcomes 
Dependent Variable: Subject Monthly Sales Index for T=7 (OLS Estimates) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
FII Model 0.63** 
   
0.85* 0.97** 1.00** 
 
(0.29) 
   
(0.48) (0.49) (0.48) 
Incentive Treatment 
 
0.25 
  
-0.11 -0.17 -0.15 
  
(0.23) 
  
(0.34) (0.34) (0.34) 
Group Treatment 
  
0.20 
 
-0.14 -0.34 -0.31 
   
(0.23) 
 
(0.34) (0.34) (0.35) 
Goal Treatment 
   
-0.02 -0.11 -0.01 0.04 
    
(0.28) (0.37) (0.36) (0.39) 
Age 
     
-0.00 -0.00 
      
(0.01) (0.01) 
Female 
     
-0.48** -0.45* 
      
(0.24) (0.24) 
Education 
     
-0.14 -0.12 
      
(0.15) (0.13) 
Self-Esteem Level 
      
0.25 
       
(0.26) 
Risk-Loving Level 
      
-0.02 
       
(0.05) 
Observations 936 936 936 936 936 936 817 
R-squared 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.08 
Clustered standard errors at the individual level in parentheses 
Time dummy coefficients and the constant are removed to respect the space of the paper 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 9A: Impacts on Economic Outcomes 
Dependent Variable: Subject Monthly Sales Index for T=7 (Tobit Estimates) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
FII Model 0.66** 
   
0.90* 1.03** 1.05** 
 
(0.31) 
   
(0.51) (0.51) (0.50) 
Incentive Treatment 
 
0.25 
  
-0.11 -0.18 -0.16 
  
(0.25) 
  
(0.35) (0.35) (0.35) 
Group Treatment 
  
0.21 
 
-0.13 -0.36 -0.31 
   
(0.24) 
 
(0.35) (0.35) (0.35) 
Goal Treatment 
   
-0.06 -0.16 -0.05 0.03 
    
(0.31) (0.39) (0.38) (0.40) 
Age 
     
-0.00 -0.00 
      
(0.01) (0.01) 
Female 
     
-0.52** -0.47* 
      
(0.26) (0.25) 
Education 
     
-0.16 -0.12 
      
(0.16) (0.14) 
Self-Esteem Level 
      
0.26 
       
(0.28) 
Risk-Loving Level 
      
-0.02 
       
(0.05) 
Observations 936 936 936 936 936 936 817 
Pseudo R-Squared 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.02 0.02 
Clustered standard errors at the individual level in parentheses 
Time dummy coefficients and the constant are removed to respect the space of the paper 
Sigma values are not included in this output but all are positive and significant for all estimations 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 10: Bootstrapped Standard Errors (1,000 Replications) 
Dependent Variable: Subject Achievement for T=6 (OLS Estimates) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
FII Model 0.15*** 
  
0.13* 0.13** 0.14** 0.14** 0.13** 
 
(0.03) 
  
(0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) 
Incentive Treatment 
 
0.18*** 
 
0.11** 0.09** 0.08 0.07 0.08* 
  
(0.04) 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) 
Group Treatment 
  
-0.04 -0.09 -0.08 -0.11* -0.09* -0.09 
   
(0.04) (0.07) (0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) 
Difficulty 
    
-0.08*** 
 
-0.08*** -0.08*** 
     
(0.01) 
 
(0.01) (0.01) 
Age 
     
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
      
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education 
     
0.01 0.00 0.00 
      
(0.02) (0.01) (0.02) 
Female 
     
-0.10*** -0.09*** -0.09*** 
      
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) 
Self-Esteem Level 
       
0.02 
        
(0.04) 
Risk-Loving Level 
       
-0.01 
        
(0.01) 
Observations 571 571 571 571 569 571 569 561 
R-squared 0.05 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.18 0.11 0.19 0.20 
Clustered bootstrapped standard errors at the individual level in parentheses 
Time dummy coefficients and the constant are removed to respect the space of the paper 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Table 11: Bootstrapped Standard Errors (1,000 Replications) 
Dependent Variable: Subject Monthly Sales Index for T=7 (OLS Estimates) 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
FII Model 0.63** 
   
0.85* 0.97* 1.00** 
 
(0.29) 
   
(0.49) (0.52) (0.49) 
Incentive Treatment 
 
0.25 
  
-0.11 -0.17 -0.15 
  
(0.23) 
  
(0.34) (0.36) (0.36) 
Group Treatment 
  
0.20 
 
-0.14 -0.34 -0.31 
   
(0.24) 
 
(0.34) (0.37) (0.37) 
Goal Treatment 
   
-0.02 -0.11 -0.01 0.04 
    
(0.28) (0.36) (0.38) (0.40) 
Age 
     
-0.00 -0.00 
      
(0.01) (0.01) 
Female 
     
-0.48** -0.45* 
      
(0.24) (0.25) 
Education 
     
-0.14 -0.12 
      
(0.15) (0.14) 
Self-Esteem Level 
      
0.25 
       
(0.25) 
Risk-Loving Level 
      
-0.02 
       
(0.05) 
Observations 936 936 936 936 936 936 817 
R-squared 0.04 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.07 0.08 
Clustered bootstrapped standard errors at the individual level in parentheses 
Time dummy coefficients and the constant are removed to respect the space of the paper 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Table 12: Probability of Achievement by Gender 
Dependent Variable: Subject Achievement for T=6 (OLS Estimates) 
 
Female Male 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
FII Model 0.17***     0.17* 0.18** 0.16* 0.16* 0.16* 0.08**     0.17** 0.16** 0.16** 0.15* 0.14 
 
(0.05) 
  
(0.09) (0.08) (0.10) (0.08) (0.08) (0.04) 
  
(0.08) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) 
Incentive  
 
0.20*** 
 
0.11* 0.09* 0.11* 0.09 0.10* 
 
0.11** 
 
-0.02 -0.01 -0.02 -0.01 0.01 
Treatment 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
 
(0.04) 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) 
Group  
  
-0.06 -0.13 -0.12* -0.12 -0.10 -0.10 
  
-0.05 -0.14** -0.12* -0.13* -0.12* -0.12* 
Treatment 
  
(0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08) (0.06) (0.07) 
  
(0.04) (0.07) (0.06) (0.07) (0.06) (0.06) 
Difficulty 
    
-0.10*** 
 
-0.10*** -0.10*** 
    
-0.04** 
 
-0.04** -0.03* 
     
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) 
    
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Age 
     
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
     
0.00 0.00 0.00 
      
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
     
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Education 
     
0.00 0.00 0.00 
     
0.01 0.01 -0.00 
      
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
     
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02) 
Self-Esteem  
       
-0.02 
       
0.09 
Level 
       
(0.05) 
       
(0.06) 
Risk-Loving  
       
-0.00 
       
-0.01 
Level 
       
(0.01) 
       
(0.01) 
Observations 356 356 356 356 354 356 354 351 215 215 215 215 215 215 215 210 
R-squared 0.06 0.09 0.04 0.10 0.23 0.11 0.23 0.23 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.07 0.10 0.07 0.10 0.12 
Clustered standard errors at the individual level in parentheses 
Time dummy coefficients and the constant are removed to respect the space of the paper 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 13: Impacts on Economic Outcomes by Gender 
Dependent Variable: Subject Monthly Sales Index for T=7 (OLS Estimates) 
  Female Male 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
FII Model 0.49       0.32 0.30 0.27 0.60       2.57*** 2.65*** 2.73*** 
 
(0.34) 
   
(0.57) (0.57) (0.57) (0.46) 
   
(0.72) (0.80) (0.77) 
Incentive Treatment 
 
0.37 
  
0.28 0.45 0.45   -0.06 
  
-1.79*** -1.78*** -1.75*** 
  
(0.27) 
  
(0.39) (0.38) (0.36)   (0.40) 
  
(0.49) (0.48) (0.49) 
Group Treatment 
  
0.11 
 
-0.01 -0.12 -0.04   
 
0.18 
 
-1.46*** -1.53*** -1.50*** 
   
(0.27) 
 
(0.38) (0.39) (0.37)   
 
(0.39) 
 
(0.50) (0.56) (0.55) 
Goal Treatment 
   
0.03 -0.15 -0.22 -0.30   
  
-0.05 1.10* 1.10* 1.35** 
    
(0.33) (0.39) (0.39) (0.45)   
  
(0.49) (0.57) (0.57) (0.57) 
Age 
     
-0.01 -0.01   
    
-0.00 0.01 
      
(0.01) (0.01)   
    
(0.02) (0.02) 
Education  
     
-0.26* -0.27*   
    
-0.08 0.00 
      
(0.16) (0.15)   
    
(0.26) (0.23) 
Self-Esteem Level 
      
0.31   
     
0.02 
       
(0.29)   
     
(0.43) 
Risk-Loving Level 
      
0.01   
     
-0.07 
       
(0.07)   
     
(0.08) 
Observations 568 568 568 568 568 568 499 368 368 368 368 368 368 318 
R-squared 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.07 0.03 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.10 0.10 0.14 
Clustered standard errors at the individual level in parentheses 
Time dummy coefficients and the constant are removed to respect the space of the paper 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 14: Probability of Achievement by Education 
Dependent Variable: Subject Achievement for T=6 (OLS Estimates) 
 
Education Greater than High School Education Less than or Equal to High School 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 
FII Model 0.15*** 
  
-0.07 -0.02 -0.07 -0.02 -0.02 0.14*** 
  
0.19** 0.19** 0.24*** 0.21** 0.21** 
 
(0.04) 
  
(0.11) (0.10) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.04) 
  
(0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) 
Incentive  
 
0.26*** 
 
0.29*** 0.22*** 0.29*** 0.22*** 0.22***   0.15*** 
 
0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.00 0.02 
Treatment 
 
(0.05) 
 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)   (0.04) 
 
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.07) (0.07) 
Group  
  
0.08 0.13 0.07 0.14 0.06 0.07   
 
-0.09* -0.16** -0.13* -0.19*** -0.15** -0.14* 
Treatment 
  
(0.05) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08)   
 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) 
Difficulty 
    
-0.08*** 
 
-0.08*** -0.08***   
   
-0.07*** 
 
-0.07*** -0.07*** 
     
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.02)   
   
(0.02) 
 
(0.02) (0.02) 
Age 
     
-0.00 0.00 -0.00   
    
-0.00 -0.00 -0.00 
      
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00)   
    
(0.00) (0.00) (0.00) 
Female 
     
0.02 -0.00 -0.00   
    
-0.14*** -0.12*** -0.12*** 
      
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05)   
    
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) 
Self-Esteem  
       
-0.05   
      
0.05 
Level 
       
(0.04)   
      
(0.05) 
Risk-Loving  
       
0.00   
      
-0.01 
Level 
       
(0.01)   
      
(0.01) 
Observations 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 193 378 378 378 378 376 378 376 368 
R-squared 0.15 0.22 0.12 0.24 0.32 0.24 0.32 0.33 0.04 0.05 0.02 0.08 0.15 0.11 0.17 0.18 
Clustered standard errors at the individual level in parentheses 
Time dummy coefficients and the constant are removed to respect the space of the paper 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 15: Impacts on Economic Outcomes by Education 
Dependent Variable: Subject Monthly Sales Index for T=7 (OLS Estimates) 
  Education Greater than High School Education Less than of Equal to High School 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 
FII Model 1.22*** 
   
1.34** 1.28* 1.31** 0.28       0.32 0.39 0.41 
 
(0.45) 
   
(0.66) (0.66) (0.62) (0.36) 
   
(0.60) (0.64) (0.65) 
Incentive Treatment 
 
0.36 
  
0.27 0.17 0.08   0.31 
  
0.14 0.03 0.08 
  
(0.35) 
  
(0.41) (0.44) (0.41)   (0.29) 
  
(0.45) (0.49) (0.50) 
Group Treatment 
  
0.75* 
 
0.01 -0.02 -0.19   
 
-0.09 
 
-0.29 -0.37 -0.35 
   
(0.42) 
 
(0.44) (0.44) (0.42)   
 
(0.29) 
 
(0.40) (0.40) (0.41) 
Goal Treatment 
   
-0.20 -0.81* -0.68 -0.65   
  
0.07 0.11 0.21 0.40 
    
(0.38) (0.45) (0.45) (0.54)   
  
(0.40) (0.48) (0.47) (0.51) 
Age 
     
0.01 0.02   
    
-0.01 -0.01 
      
(0.01) (0.01)   
    
(0.01) (0.01) 
Female 
     
-0.31 -0.41   
    
-0.46 -0.39 
      
(0.40) (0.44)   
    
(0.30) (0.29) 
Self-Esteem Level 
      
0.61   
     
0.05 
       
(0.42)   
     
(0.30) 
Risk-Loving Level 
      
-0.05   
     
0.01 
       
(0.08)   
     
(0.06) 
Observations 327 327 327 327 327 327 288 609 609 609 609 609 609 529 
R-squared 0.13 0.03 0.07 0.02 0.17 0.18 0.22 0.02 0.02 0.01 0.01 0.03 0.05 0.06 
Clustered standard errors at the individual level in parentheses 
Time dummy coefficients and the constant are removed to respect the space of the paper 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
! 36 
Appendix B: Additional Recruitment Information 
The Bank called over 500 members to attend three different recruitment sessions where the 
potential subjects were introduced to basic components of the project.  At the end of each 
recruitment meeting, the subjects knew that it was a project through the University of San 
Francisco that could potentially improve their economic situation with a small payment for 
their time and effort.  In the first and largest meeting, the potential subjects also created the 
name Empresarios en Crecimiento Para el Desarrollo for the project through group 
discussion and voting.  The other two meetings, which were much smaller, had the same 
presentation as the first meeting.  The first survey completed was during the orientation to 
serve as a focus group for the goal choices to be offered to the participants.  For the 
additional control group in December 2012, they filled out this survey during their meeting.  
These questions asked about their personal and business related strengths and weaknesses.  
The survey also included basic demographic, income, participation with The Bank, and 
business questions.  After the subjects that chose to participate signed consent forms, the 
138 individuals were randomly assigned into five different groups using a random number 
generator.  Each subject was randomly selected for treatment individually except for the 
solidarity circle group, which was treated as a single subject and placed in one treatment 
group to avoid crosstalk.  If an address matched between subjects or the last name was the 
same, a coin was flipped to determine which of the two assigned groups both subjects would 
remain.  Subjects with family members in the program were randomly assigned to a cell 
together. Based on the neighborhoods of the subjects and the locations of the CEDEZOs 
where the meetings were to be held, the randomly placed participant was either classified 
into the San Javier or El Centro meeting locations in Medellin. 
 
Appendix C: Translated Instruction Handouts to Subjects 
Rules of the Game 
GROUP 1 
 
1. You personally must attend the meetings - family members and friends may not complete your survey 
or turn in your documentation for you.  Only the person who signed the consent form may 
participate in the project.   
 
2. When completing surveys during the project, we appreciate your honesty and accuracy with each 
answer.  Please answer all questions in each survey.   
 
! 37 
3. As the consent form states, you understand that you were placed in 1 of 5 different groups.  We 
appreciate keeping your group assignment and rules confidential to others outside of your group.    
 
4. Payment of $25,000 is based on a complete survey. 
 
 
Rules of the Game 
GROUP 2 
 
1. Achieved goals must have documentation with dates that correspond to the previous four weeks. 
   
2. You can achieve more than one goal but we will only record the progress of the goal you choose from 
the list provided. 
 
3. Documentation for goal achievement must be submitted the day and time of the meeting. 
 
4. If you miss two meetings you will be asked not to continue with the project. 
 
5. You personally must attend the meetings - family members and friends may not complete your survey 
or turn in your documentation for you.   
 
6. When completing surveys during the project, we appreciate your honesty and accuracy with each 
answer.  Please answer all questions in each survey.   
 
7. As the consent form states, you understand that you were placed in 1 of 5 different groups.  We 
appreciate keeping your group assignment and rules confidential to others outside of your group.    
 
8. If a fellow group member is your business partner, you may not choose the same business related 
goals. 
 
9. If a fellow group member lives in your home and you are not in the same business, you must submit 
different documentation indicating each individual’s goal achievement.   
 
10. Please note that some goals are repeatable and some are not repeatable.   
 
11. The goal requirements are minimums not maximum thresholds.  Partial payment is not given for 
partial completion.  
 
12. Payment of $30,000 is based on a complete survey and appropriate goal documentation for a goal 
regardless of whether you completed it or not.  
 
Rules of the Game 
GROUP 3 
 
1. Achieved goals must have documentation with dates that correspond to the previous four weeks. 
   
2. You can achieve more than one goal but we will only record the progress of the goal you choose from 
the list provided. 
 
3. Documentation for goal achievement must be submitted the day and time of the meeting. 
 
4. If you miss two meetings you will be asked not to continue with the project. 
 
5. You personally must attend the meetings - family members and friends may not complete your survey 
or turn in your documentation for you.   
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6. When completing surveys during the project, we appreciate your honesty and accuracy with each 
answer.  Please answer all questions in each survey.   
 
7. As the consent form states, you understand that you were placed in 1 of 5 different groups.  We 
appreciate keeping your group assignment and rules confidential to others outside of your group.    
 
8. If a fellow group member is your business partner, you may not choose the same business related 
goals. 
 
9. If a fellow group member lives in your home and you are not in the same business, you must submit 
different documentation indicating each individual’s goal achievement.   
 
10. Please note that some goals are repeatable and some are not repeatable.   
 
11. The goal requirements are minimums not maximum thresholds.  Partial payment is not given for 
partial completion.   
 
12. Payment of $30,000 is based on a complete survey and appropriate goal documentation for a goal 
regardless of whether you completed it or not.  
 
Rules of the Game 
GROUP 4 
 
1. Achieved goals must have documentation with dates that correspond to the previous four weeks. 
   
2. You can achieve more than one goal but we will only record the progress of the goal you choose from 
the list provided. 
 
3. Documentation for goal achievement must be submitted the day and time of the meeting. 
 
4. If you miss two meetings you will be asked not to continue with the project. 
 
5. You personally must attend the meetings - family members and friends may not complete your survey 
or turn in your documentation for you.   
 
6. When completing surveys during the project, we appreciate your honesty and accuracy with each 
answer.  Please answer all questions in each survey.   
 
7. As the consent form states, you understand that you were placed in 1 of 5 different groups.  We 
appreciate keeping your group assignment and rules confidential to others outside of your group.    
 
8. If a fellow group member is your business partner, you may not choose the same business related 
goals. 
 
9. If a fellow group member lives in your home and you are not in the same business, you must submit 
different documentation indicating each individual’s goal achievement.   
 
10. Please note that some goals are repeatable and some are not repeatable.   
 
11. The goal requirements are minimums not maximum thresholds.  Partial payment is not given for 
partial completion.   
 
12. Payment of $35,000 is based on a complete survey and appropriate goal documentation for a 
completed goal.  
 
13. You will receive a payment of $5,000 if you complete a survey but do not achieve your goal. 
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Rules of the Game 
GROUP 5 
 
1. Achieved goals must have documentation with dates that correspond to the previous four weeks. 
   
2. You can achieve more than one goal but we will only record the progress of the goal you choose from 
the list provided. 
 
3. Documentation for goal achievement must be submitted the day and time of the meeting. 
 
4. If you miss two meetings you will be asked not to continue with the project. 
 
5. You personally must attend the meetings - family members and friends may not complete your survey 
or turn in your documentation for you.   
 
6. When completing surveys during the project, we appreciate your honesty and accuracy with each 
answer.  Please answer all questions in each survey.   
 
7. As the consent form states, you understand that you were placed in 1 of 5 different groups.  We 
appreciate keeping your group assignment and rules confidential to others outside of your group.    
  
8. If a fellow group member is your business partner, you may not choose the same business related 
goals. 
 
9. If a fellow group member lives in your home and you are not in the same business, you must submit 
different documentation indicating each individual’s goal achievement.   
 
10. Please note that some goals are repeatable and some are not repeatable.   
 
11. The goal requirements are minimums not maximum thresholds.  Partial payment is not given for 
partial completion. 
 
12. Payment of $35,000 is based on a complete survey, appropriate goal documentation for a completed 
goal, and participation in the group meetings.  
 
13. You will receive a payment of $5,000 if you complete a survey and participate in the group meetings 
but do not achieve your goal. 
 
 
 
Appendix D: Survey Instruments 
 
The following pages contain the translated surveys used during the experiment.  
